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The Necessity of Recognizing
Distinctions: Lessons from Evangelical
Critiques of Christian Feminist
Theology
By Randy L. Maddox
Surely it is now clear that the feminist critique within Christian circles and the 307
attempts to develop alternative inclusive forms of Christian confession and prac-
tice are more than a passing fad. The issues raised and the suggestions made
affect central aspects of traditional Christian life and thought. As such, it is
crucial that Christian scholars and leaders, particularly those in the evangelical
traditions, enter into dialogue with these issues in an honest attempt to deter-
mine their appropriateness to or possible contradiction of the essential Christian
faith.
One aspect of any such a dialogue would be exegetical debates about the
relevant biblical materials. Such debates have been taking place in evangelical
circles for some time now. While they have often been overly polemical, they
have nonetheless spawned a number of careful studies representing signifi-
cantly diverse conclusions—from total rejections of the feminist critique to at-
tempts at articulating a biblical feminism.1
Much slower in forthcoming have been evangelical assessments of the more
general theological claims and conclusions of Christian feminists. The purpose of
the present essay is to summarize the concerns of three largely negative assess-
ments that have appeared and reflect on the adequacy of their assumptions and
method.2 As we shall see, these studies all focus on issues related to the nature
of God and of God-language, expressing serious concerns about or rejections of
the feminist alternatives to traditional "male" views of God.3
Feminist contributions to Christian theology have encountered mixed responses from
Christian theologians of other persuasions. In this review essay Randy L. Maddox dis-
cusses three recent books which criticize feminist theology from an evangelical standpoint,
and draws conclusions about the "necessity of recognizing distinctions." Mr. Maddox,




William Oddie is a fellow of St. Cross College and the librarian of Pusey
House, Oxford. As such, he is a representative of evangelical high-church An-
glicanism in the tradition of C. S. Lewis. His contribution to the evangelical
assessment of Christian feminism arose in response to the Movement for the
Ordination of Women in Anglicanism. Oddie is convinced that much more is at
stake in this issue than simply ordination. Ultimately, he is worried about What
will happen to God4 if the feminist perspectives which ground the movement are
adopted, because he realizes that these perspectives call into question traditional
understandings of the "nature of man and of God himself" (pp. xi, 26). The goal
of Oddie's book, then, is to defend the Fatherhood of God, the Sonship of Christ
(xiii) and the legitimacy of traditional masculine/feminine characterizations and
corresponding social roles (pp. 24, 33, 63ff).
Foundational to Oddie's defense of traditional positions and rejection of
feminist critiques are three basic presuppositions. First, he assumes that the fact
that God's self-revelation came within the particular social structures of the
biblical cultures bestows on these cultures a divine warrant which makes them
normative for all times and places (pp. 50-51). When Christian feminists dare to
criticize any aspect of these cultures it is taken as evidence that they do not really
believe in revelation (pp. xii, 27). Instead, they are accused of seeking to sub-
stitute their ideas about God for God's idea of Godself (p. 110).
Second, Oddie assumes that the task of theology is simply to hand on
unchanged (or, if presently lost, to recover) the doctrinal formulations of the
early Church.5 He rejects totally the suggestion that theology is actually a con-
structive activity and that the changed situation of the modern Church requires a
reconstruction of basic traditional doctrines,6 arguing that this suggestion leads
inevitably to theology merely mirroring the ever shifting secular assumptions of
the passing age (p. xii).
Finally, Oddie assumes that the authority of human experience in general
and Christian tradition in particular is identical with the majority opinion on
*For a survey of the variety of current readings of biblical texts on the role and status of women see
Randy L. Maddox, "The Word of God and Patriarchalism: A Typology of the Contemporary Christian
Debate," Perspectives in Religious Studies, nyp.
2Note that we are reviewing evangelical critiques of the Christian feminists, not evangelical attempts to
articulate a Christian feminist position such as, in particular, Letha Dawson Scanzoni and Nancy A.
Hardesty, All We're Meant to Be: Biblical Feminism for Today, Second Edition (Nashville: Abingdon, 1986).
3For an evangelical analysis that attempts to suggest the possible positive contributions and insights of
the Christian feminist critique for the whole range of Christian doctrine see Randy L. Maddox, "Toward
an Inclusive Theology: The Systematic Implications of the Feminist Critique," Christian Scholar's Review
16 (1986-7): 7-23.
4William Oddie, What Will Happen to God?: Feminism and the Reconstruction of Christian Belief (London:
SPCK, 1984).
5In keeping with his Anglican tradition, he appears to limit authoritative Christian tradition to the first
four centuries of the Church. More importantly, he limits it to the traditional reading of this period,
arguing that feminist investigations of early Church history "fabricate" evidence for their claims rather
than recognizing what is really there (cf. his comments of Elizabeth Schussler Fiorenza, p. 143).
6Cf. p. 119 and the pejorative use of the word "reconstruction" in the subtitle of his book.
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whatever issue is at question. He repeatedly charges that Christian feminist
critiques and alternatives are minority opinions and, hence, necessarily false
(pp. 33, 63, 78). More pointedly, he argues that the failure of Christian feminists
to agree with the majority proves that they reject authority per se, opting instead
for pure independence or individualism in matters of religious belief (p. 82).
The validity of these presuppositions which form the basis for Oddie's
critique is quite questionable. For example, most biblical scholars, including
evangelicals, argue that it is essential to distinguish between the normative
elements of God's revelation in the biblical cultures and the elements which are
relative to those cultures alone or may even contradict God's revelation.7 If
Oddie wants to claim that the male-normative features of biblical cultures are
essential to God's revelation he should ground the claim in careful exegesis, not
mere assertion.8
Likewise, affirmation of the constructive and situation-related nature of
theological affirmations is axiomatic for nearly all modern theologians, liberal
and conservative.9 If Oddie is rejecting this central contemporary theological
conviction, he is surely obligated to do so explicitly rather than by default.
Finally, it is quite ironic to find one who repeatedly emphasizes the reality
of original sin and its distorting effects on human understanding (at least on
feminist understanding (see pp. 26, 101), arguing that the majority opinion of
human societies (or human Christian tradition) is self-evidently of ultimate author-
ity in norming Christian life and thought.
Obviously, the problematic character of Oddie's foundational presupposi-
tions weakens the persuasiveness of his overall argument. There is, however, an
even more serious methodological problem with his study. Put briefly, Oddie
consistently distorts the Christian feminist position by confusing it with or un-
fairly identifying it with post-Christian feminist advocates and claims.
To begin with, Oddie repeatedly draws on Goddess movement advocates
like Carol Christ, Mary Daly and Judith Plaskow in his exposition of what
Christian feminists purportedly believe and seek, even though all of these wom-
en are explicitly post-Christian feminists (cf. pp. 3, 9, 17, 78). When pressed on
this matter, Oddie argues that any apparent disagreements about theological
issues between Christian and post-Christian feminists are actually insignificant
because "the wildest and most spiritually dangerous beliefs are not enough to
break the solidarity of the 'sisterhood'" that unites them (pp. 18-19). However,
'Tor evangelical examples of such a distinction (and some guidelines for helping determine what is
normative), see Gordon Fee and Douglas Stuart, How to Read the Bible for All It Is Worth (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1982), pp. 65-70; and David Scholer, "Unseasonable Thoughts on the State of Biblical
Hermeneutics," American Baptist Quarterly 2 (1983): 134-41.
8For a detailed evangelical exegetical argument that male-normative aspects of Scripture are not essen-
tial revelation, see Gilbert Bilezikian, Beyond Sex Roles (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1985).
9Note the commonality of this theme in the variety of contemporary positions treated in The Vocation of
the Theologian, edited by Theodore W. Jennings, Jr. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985). See also the chapter
on "Theology Today" in Gillian Evans, Alister McGrath and Allan Galloway, The Science of Theology,
Vol. I (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), pp. 345-52.
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320 the only evidence he presents for such a solidarity is the fact that Christian
feminists often recommend the reading of Mary Daly's Beyond God the Father.10
Apparently, he assumes that this implies they agree with everything in Daly's
book—surely a questionable assumption. Or, perhaps Oddie is assuming a
version of Harold Lindsell's notorious "slippery slope" argument—namely, if
one ever grants any truth or sympathy to any argument of the post-Christian
feminists they will soon become one themselves!11 Either way, his assumption
blinds him to numerous crucial differences that do exist between Christian and
post-Christian feminists.
For example, it is simply not the case that most Christian feminist the-
ologians advocate literal construals of God as female alongside of or in place of
God as male.12 Rather most of them argue for a recovery of the classical under-
standing of the analogical nature of all God-language including both male and
female language about God.13 Where they differ from Oddie is not in arguing
God is female but in denying that God is male in any literal sense14 and in
affirming that both male and female analogies of God have biblical warrant and
provide important disclosures of truth about God.
It is likewise not the case, as Oddie claims (p. 38), that Christian feminist
theologians typically endorse an androgynous model of humanity, though
many post-Christian feminists do. Actually, most Christian feminists are very
critical of the concept of androgyny.15 Their concern is to argue that humanity as
male and female are equal, not that they are the same.
Several other examples of distortions in Oddie's caricature of Christian
feminism could be mentioned. We will conclude, instead, by noting two other
limitations of his study in general. First, he apparently is incapable of empathiz-
ing with the oppression that many women feel from male-normative language
and social structures. Thus, he asks incredulously how such practices as the
rabbinic prayer that thanks God for not being born a woman (p. 47) or such
teachings as Aquinas's claim that women are misbegotten males (p. 148) could
possibly be construed as misogynist!
Finally, the entire study is soured by a strident tone which renders it un-
likely to communicate any legitimate concerns which Oddie might raise about
Christian feminism. Not uncommon are rhetorical flourishes such as the com-
10(Boston: Beacon Press, 1973). This is Daly's first and still most readable post-Christian articulation of
religious feminism.
"Note his claim that the life story of Meinrad Craighead (a Benedictine who began to study Goddess
worship and eventually left the order) is a kind of locus dassicus of feminist spirituality (p. 81).
12See, for example, the strong Christian feminist critique of the Goddess movement in Denise Lardner
Carmody, Feminism and Christianity: A Two-Way Reflection (Nashville: Abingdon, 1982), pp. 33-5.
13For more details on this topic see Maddox, "Inclusive Theology," pp. 13-14.
14Cf. Oddie's claim that talk about God as Father is more than metaphorical (p. 119—which he seems to
equate with analogical, p. 112), it is symbolic—which he defines as involving a literal, though suprara-
tional, identity with what is described. In this whole discussion Oddie shows little understanding of the
important classical distinctions between metaphorical, analogical, univocal and symbolic language.
15See, for example, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1983), pp. 110-11.
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parison of feminist revisions of the liturgy with the ideological propaganda of
the Soviet Encyclopedia (p. 108)! Throughout Oddie makes abundantly clear his
conviction that Christian feminists are solely responsible for the Church's cur-
rent "bitter harvest of division, anger, suspicion and all uncharitableness" (p.
155).
Obviously, a book with such serious flaws does not hold much promise of
promoting or guiding a constructive dialogue between traditional evangelical
Christianity and the Christian feminist critique.
Donald Bloesch, Book I
Donald Bloesch, professor of Systematic Theology at Dubuque Theological
Seminary, is a prominent American evangelical theologian. His numerous books
on the nature of evangelical piety and theology have earned him a reputation for
fairness in describing alternative viewpoints and insight in analyzing theological
problems. As such, one would expect his two recent books pertaining to the
Christian feminist critique to be more helpful than Oddie's. Such expectations
are, unfortunately, only partially fulfilled.
In his first study Bloesch struggles with the question: 7s the Bible Sexist?16
Exposure to the feminist critique has convinced him that ideological pa-
triarchalism is not a Christian alternative. However, he is equally suspicious of
ideological feminism because both alternatives (in his view) focus on humanity
and our selfish concerns rather than on God and others. Accordingly, Bloesch's
stated aim is to provide an evangelical alternative beyond patriarchalism and
feminism (p. 11). In reality, what he presents is a position he calls "reformed
patriarchalism" (p. 86).17
The content of Bloesch's "reformed patriarchalism" is most evident in his
discussion of male/female relationships in society and home. He believes that
feminists want to deny all interdependence of man and woman, both within and
outside of marriage (pp. 39, 86). By contrast, he argues, the Bible stresses the
interdependence of the sexes and the ultimate dependence of woman on man.
He is convinced that Scripture presents male headship as part of God's creation
will for the good of woman. At the same time, he is sensitive to how such
headship has frequently taken oppressive forms due to sin (p. 32). Accordingly,
he argues that the truly Christian way for the male to exercise headship is
Christ's model of servanthood (pp. 85ff.), leading to ideal male/female rela-
tionships of mutual submission. In those less than ideal cases where full agree-
ment or mutuality is not possible, however, he reaffirms male headship (pp. 58,
88 89)—thus, his "reformed patriarchalism."
The second major issue that Bloesch deals with in his first study is the
debate about women in positions of spiritual leadership. Here he is much more
312
16(Westchester, 111.: Crossway Books, 1982).
17Cf. the treatment of Bloesch under the general category of "Liberated Traditionalists" in Maddox,
"Word of God."
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322 critical of past tradition than on the previous issue. Indeed, he presents a strong
argument for women in all forms of ministry, including the ministry of word and
sacrament. He bases his argument ultimately on the implications of the doctrine
of the priesthood of all believers.
One might expect such a strong defense of women in ministry to endear
Bloesch to Christian feminists. However, they actually find his position quite
problematic because of his significant qualification that women ministers must
continue to be "womanly."18 At issue here are not matters like manner of dress
but Bloesch's concern that women ministers not call into question the principle
of male headship or the worthiness of the vocation of motherhood (pp. 55-56).
This concern leads him to prefer celibate women ministers since they would not
be neglecting their family duties or inviting possible conflicts with their spouse's
vocational opportunities (pp. 58-59).19 In addition, Bloesch suggests that a
woman minister should not hold a position where she exercises authority over a
male staff member.20 Clearly, he is not advocating total equality of women in
ministry.
The final topic Bloesch discusses in Is the Bible Sexist? is the suggested
modifications of God-language that have been put forward by feminists. On the
surface, Bloesch seems to bring a more-developed awareness of the intricacies of
God-language to his analysis of this topic than we noted in Oddie. He explicitly
mentions the classical theological distinction that human language about God is
neither totally univocal nor totally figurative; it is analogical (p. 67). According to
this classical distinction, human God-language does assert a real similarity be-
tween the ordinary meaning of a term and the meaning of this term in reference
to God. However, this similarity is always one of proportionality, not identity.21
Thus, for example, to call God "Father" is not to equate God totally with the
normal characteristics of a human father. In particular, it does not imply God is
exclusively male, for the God of the Bible actually transcends the human gender
division into male and female, embracing both in the image of God (p. 66).
Actually, Bloesch's reference to the category of analogy is not as traditional
as it appears at first. When pushed, it becomes clear that he believes there is
more univocal content in analogical attribution than the classic understanding of
analogy would allow.22 This is particularly the case in the area of gender (social
stereotype?!23) references to God, as can be seen both in Bloesch's analysis of
biblical God-language and in his reservations about feminist God-language.
18Cf. reviews of Is the Bible Sexist? by Ginny Soley in Sojourners 12.3 (March 1983): 41-2, and David
Scholer in Update 10.2 (Summer 1986): 14-5.
19There is no mention of similar concerns about male ministers and their family life!
20Another option Bloesch mentions that would satisfy both of these concerns is husband/wife ministry
teams like those of the Salvation Army.
21Cf. the classic discussion of analogy in Eric Mascall, Existence and Analogy (London: Longmans, 1949),
pp. 97-121.
22Bloesch seemed closer to this classical sense of analogy in his earlier works. See especially Essentials of
Evangelical Theology, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 11:275.
23Note that Bloesch consistently uses the terms "masculine" and "feminine" rather than "male" and
"female," thereby confusing distinctions of physical gender with distinctions of social roles and ster-
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Feminist protests have convinced Bloesch that traditional Christian Ian- 313
guage for God has been too exclusively patriarchal, overlooking the female
imagery for God present in Scripture itself (pp. 65-66). However, he does not
draw from this realization the conclusion that male and female analogies for God
are equally legitimate. Rather, he argues that it is providential that patriarchal
and masculine [sic] imagery is used in Scripture to describe the being and acts of
God more than feminine [sic] imagery (p. 68). While God is not literally male,
masculine imagery is more appropriate to God because the biblical God is more
properly a God of power, initiative and superordination than a God of nurture
and receptivity (pp. 66, 72). To alter the predominance of male imagery for God
would, Bloesch argues, obscure this essential Christian understanding of the
nature of God.24
It is in this context that one must understand Bloesch's rejections of feminist
alternatives to traditional God-language. He is convinced, for example, that any
increase in the use of female imagery for God will lead to a form of pantheism or
nature mysticism (pp. 10, 63-64). At the same time, he believes the alternative
recommended practice of avoiding all personal images for God will lead inevita-
bly to a deistic or Neoplatonic view of God (p. 65). Thus, the biblical precedent
must be maintained.
Such are Bloesch's concerns and convictions in Is the Bible Sexist? As a more
nuanced and scholarly work than Oddie's, it clearly should be more helpful in
fostering dialogue between traditional evangelical theology and the Christian
feminists. Ultimately, however, we believe the value it has in this regard is more
in helping to locate what the crucial issues are (particularly in relation to under-
standings of God) than in providing final solutions to these issues.
For example, it becomes clear in Bloesch's discussion that the analogical
status of God-language is a crucial issue. While Bloesch appears to assume that
feminists advocate understanding God as literally female, Christian feminist
theologians are actually more concerned to reaffirm the truly analogical nature of
God-language and, thereby, to reject as idolatrous any literal understanding of
God as male or female.25 By contrast, while Bloesch himself verbally affirms the
analogical nature of God-language, we have seen that he ultimately holds out for
a univocal "core" of reference in the biblical masculine imagery for God, thereby
advocating an understanding of God as more properly male than female.26
Christian feminists would suggest this is still an idolatrous view.
eotypes! He apparently believes that physical gender differences are ontological bases for the social
differences, though he never explicitly argues this point.
24This conviction helps explain as well Bloesch's total lack of concern about using exclusively masculine
pronouns to refer to God. Note, in particular, such sentences as: "God in his (emphasis added) relation
to us as Nurturer, Guide and Comforter may be envisaged as feminine" (p. 72).
25Obviously, this is A generalization about the tendency among Christian feminist theologians, not a claim
that there are no examples of feminists who construe God as literally female. For backing for this
generalization, see the references in Maddox, "Inclusive Theology," pp. 13-14.
26Bloesch would say "more properly 'masculine'" but, again, he seems to assume such social traits are
ontologically grounded in gender distinctions.
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324 Likewise, Bloesch correctly perceives that the feminist rejection of ex-
clusively male God-language is inherently a rejection of the hierarchal and du-
alistic understandings of God that predominate in Western Christian tradition
(and the corresponding hierarchal understanding of the relationship of male and
female). For Bloesch, such a rejection of hierarchal views of God is simply
unacceptable (pp. 10, 62). However, he never addresses the claim of Christian
feminists that hierarchal and dualistic understandings of God are actually dis-
torted ("male") impositions on the biblical understanding of God.27
Actually, it is not surprising that Bloesch does not answer this Christian
feminist claim. In reality, he does not appear to be very aware of their position.
The feminists he tends to quote throughout the book are primarily political and
philosophical feminists. When he does quote feminist theologians, he draws
almost totally on post-Christian feminists such as Mary Daly and Naomi Golden-
berg. There is no significant interaction with Christian feminists such as Rose-
mary Ruether, Phyllis Trible and Virginia Mollenkott. More disappointingly,
from an evangelical perspective, there is no mention at all of Letha Scanzoni and
Nancy Hardesty's groundbreaking evangelical feminist book All We're Meant to
Be, even though it had been in circulation for seven years!
The predictable result of neglecting these serious attempts to formulate a
Christian feminism is that Bloesch repeatedly portrays as "the uniform feminist
position" stances that most Christian feminists would either significantly qualify
or reject.28 One can only wonder why Bloesch would attempt a Christian analy-
sis of feminism without the benefit or courtesy of dialoguing with the readily
available works of Christian feminists.
A further surprising weakness in Is the Bible Sexist? is Bloesch's simplistic
references to the "language of Canaan" as a defense for the predominance of
male imagery in Christian God-talk.29 Bloesch, in his earlier works, developed a
reputation as an evangelical who affirmed a careful distinction between the
Word of God and the words of Scripture and who recognized that God's revela-
tion in Scripture contains a fallible element due to the cultural limitations of the
writers.30 By contrast, he now rejects any attempt to separate the meaning of
Scripture from its culturally conditioned form (p. 13), apparently accepting the
biblical cultures as divinely ordained and warranted (p. 76).
At least, he so accepts their male-normative linguistic practice. He does not,
however, adopt every aspect of biblical cultures. For example, we have seen him
dissent from the Old Testament exclusion of women from priestly ministry. But,
27See especially Sallie McFague, Metaphorical Theology. Models of God in Religious Language (Philadelphia:
Fortress, 1982), pp. 21, 166ff.
28Compare his generalizations about feminists supporting androgyny, pantheism, etc., with the survey
of Christian feminists in Maddox, "Inclusive Theology."
29For a more sophisticated defense of such "language of Canaan" against the critique of feminists see
Vernard Eller, The Language of Canaan and the Grammar of Feminism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982). Cf.
our argument in a review of Eller (Christian Scholar's Review 12 [1983]: 267-69) that the logic of his case is
fundamentally flawed.
30Cf. Bloesch, Essentials, 1:68-9.
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this poses a key issue that Bloesch never addresses. What are the hermeneutic
principles that justify his rejection of one aspect of biblical cultures while affirm-
ing another aspect. Until such principles are stated and defended, his option for
the "language of Canaan" appears, at best, subjective and arbitrary.
The final, most annoying, problem with Is the Bible Sexist? is Bloesch's
uncritical utilization throughout of stereotypical Western middle-class under-
standings of "masculine" and "feminine" as if they were ontologically
grounded and universally accepted characterizations (cf. pp. 66, 36-37).31 Such
lack of sensitivity is made all the more notable by his frequent protest against
harmonizing biblical faith with any cultural ideology (p. 13).
Donald Bloesch, Book II
Bloesch's deepest concerns about the Christian feminist/traditionalist de-
bate emerge in his second book. He now considers resistance to Christian femi-
nist understandings of God to be, ultimately, The Battle for the Trinity.32 More
precisely, he now argues that the main issues at stake in this debate are: 1) the
viability of the doctrine of the trinity and 2) the acceptance of the authority of
Scripture (p. xv).
Bloesch's claim to be defending the doctrine of the trinity against the femi-
nists is, in a real sense, misleading.33 In his development of this claim it becomes
clear that he is still primarily concerned to defend the normative status of male
imagery for God. He views the essence of the doctrine of the trinity to be its
affirmation that God is personal (as opposed to being the impersonal or su-
prapersonal ground and source of all existence, p. 11) and he believes that this
affirmation of God as personal is inextricably interwoven with the primary use of
male imagery for God.34
Bloesch develops his defense of male imagery for God in this second study
through a more explicit consideration of the nature of God-language. Drawing
on Sally McFague, he makes a distinction between seeing God-language as
metaphorical—giving seminal insights but no exact (univocal) or even propor-
tional (analogical) knowledge; or as symbolic—assuming a greater adequacy of
such language to communicate reliable knowledge of God's reality (p. 16). He
then argues, with real warrant, that the tendency of modern theologians in
general and feminists in particular is to construe God-language primarily as
metaphorical, thereby emphasizing the lack of correspondance beween such
language (the sign) and God's nature (the signified) (pp. 17-22). By contrast, he
wants to assert the symbolic nature of God-language and, thereby, the signifi-
cant correspondence between God-language and God's nature.
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31For an analysis of these stereotypes as culturally relative, see Scanzoni and Hardesty, All We're Meant
to Be, pp. 95-108.
32Ann Arbor: Servant, 1985.
33See below our argument that many Christian feminists articulate a more thoroughly Trinitarian view of
God than Bloesch.
^See his response to a critique of this book by Thomas Finger in TSF Bulletin 10.1 (1986-7): 43, point 7.
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316 But, what is the nature and extent of this correspondence? Frankly, on this
issue Bloesch's presentation is confusing, if not contradictory. At times he ap-
pears to equate symbolic language with analogical language—suggesting a cor-
respondence of proportionality (pp. 16, 17).35 At other times he treats "symbol"
as a more general category that embraces both metaphor and analogy (p. 21). At
still other times he uses "symbolic" disparagingly as the opposite of "true
knowledge" (pp. 13, 35). While this confusion makes a schema of Bloesch's
understanding of the nature of God-language impossible, his fundamental con-
cern is clear: he wants to affirm that human (especially, biblical) language about
God expresses at least a core of "true knowledge" about God. Moreover, it is
clear he sees this emphasis as moving in the opposite direction of most influen-
tial modern theologians.36
It is also clear that Bloesch considers the masculine [sic]37 connotations of
the symbol of God as Father to be central to the "true knowledge" we have
about God. Indeed, he argues explicitly that God as Father is a controlling
symbol for the Christian understanding of God. By contrast, any biblical images
of God as Mother are only metaphorical (pp. 34-35). As such, while the God of
the Bible is not literally male (p. xviii), Bloesch does consider this God as more
properly "masculine" than "feminine."
What are Bloesch's grounds for arguing that the image of God as Father is
the controlling symbol for a Christian understanding of God? At first, he simply
argues that biblical symbols establish the parameters of theological thinking (p.
26). Such a claim is, of course, problematic because some central symbols and
affirmations of Christian faith are not directly biblically attested: for example,
God as triune! More importantly, the Bible actually contains a wealth of symbols
for God, including several female symbols.
So, why elevate the male or "masculine" symbols as controlling symbols? It
appears that Bloesch's main reason is simply the predominance of male images
versus, in particular, female images in the Bible. Since God is addressed more
often in male terms and ascribed "masculine" characteristics, God is more prop-
erly masculine than feminine. But again, this argument is very problematic. A
central principle of Christian biblical hermeneutics is that the focus and au-
thoritative grid of revelation is Christ's life and teachings. As such, Christ's
imagery for God should be determinative.
This may appear to play into Bloesch's hands since Christ's most charac-
35He suggests that McFague makes this connection. She does not! Indeed, the major weakness of
Metaphorical Theology is that she never clarifies the relationship of her understanding of metaphorical
and symbolic language to the classical understanding of analogy.
^We would also suggest that it is out-of-step with the classical understanding of analogy because it does
not take the disjunctive aspect of proportionality seriously enough. This is seen most clearly in his
suggestion that some (male only?!) biblical analogies for God proceed from above to below (pp. 18, 25,
45). Such an attempt to bypass human experience and leap directly to revelation seems both cognitively
impossible and theologically illegitimate. The God we meet in Christ is One who meets us where we are
and transforms us within that context.
37Bloesch continues to use "masculine" and "feminine" instead of "male" and "female" in this book
and to construe the former in terms of traditional Western middle-class stereotypes. Cf. pp. 32-3, 37.
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teristic form of addressing God was Abba. However, two points must be noted in 317
this regard. First, Christ also used numerous female images for God, often
seeming to purposely balance a male image with a female image.38 Second, it can
be powerfully argued that one of Christ's main concerns in adopting the familiar
(as contrasted with formal) term Abba was to overcome the patriarchal (traditional
"masculine"!) elements in the understanding of God in his day.39
Another reason Bloesch suggests for considering male images of God as
normative is that use of female imagery, or alternations between male and
female imagery, is more likely to attribute sexuality to God than is the use of
"generic" male language (p. 44).40 Obviously, the logic of this argument is
totally dependant upon whether male-normative language really functions ge-
nerically—a very debated issue.41
Bloesch's final argument for treating male imagery for God as normative is
the claim that the specific analogies for God of "Father," "Son" and "Lord" are
analogies sui generi. They are not derived from the experience of human fa-
therhood but from God's act of revelation (pp. 45, 18). They are not our names
for God but God's self-appellation (p. 25). (As contrasted, apparently, with the
female metaphors for God.) Ultimately, this argument is a reformulation of the
appeal to the "language of Canaan" in his first book. While tangential in that
study, Bloesch now develops this appeal into the second major front in The Battle
for the Trinity.
Indeed, the primary advance of Bloesch's second book over the first is that it
addresses directly the issue of how, or whether, one can adopt alternative Chris-
tian feminist linguistic formulations and still affirm the primary authority of
Scripture in matters of doctrine. This, in itself, increases the value of the second
study for facilitating evangelical analyses of feminism, even if, as we shall argue,
Bloesch's particular stance on this issue is problematic.
Bloesch's basic claim concerning this issue is that the feminists' desire to
adopt more inclusive terms for God and/or seek a more equal balance of male
and female images for God than found in the Bible itself inherently rejects the
authority of Scripture, substituting as an authority their subjective human expe-
rience (p. 64). Clearly, behind this charge lie understandings of the nature of
scriptural authority and the role of experience in theology whose adequacy must
be examined.
Integral to anyone's affirmation of Scripture for norming Christian belief is
their assumed model of divine revelation in general and the divine inspiration of
Scripture as the definitive locus of this revelation in particular. What is Bloesch's
38Cf. Ben Witherington III, Women in the Ministry of Jesus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984), pp. 35ff.
39See especially Robert Hamerton-Kelly, God the Father: Theology and Patriarchy in the Teaching of Jesus
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979).
^ee also Bloesch, "Reply," p. 43, pt. 7.
41One of the best surveys of this debate is Sexist Language, edited by Mary Vetterling-Braggin (Totowa,
N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1981).
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318 model? It appears to be dangerously "docetic": i.e., to not take seriously enough
the human side of the reception and conceptualization of revelation.
Indeed, at times Bloesch seems to approach a dictation method of inspira-
tion where the very words and symbols of Scripture are seen as entirely God's
formulation. In particular, he repeatedly argues that the choice of symbols used
for God in Scripture was God's own, not a human choice (pp. 26, 95). More
radically, he argues that the very content and meaning of these symbols is given
de novo in God's act of revelation, not derived from human experience.42 Surely,
this undercuts any significant role for the experience, limitations or contribu-
tions of the human authors of the Bible.
Such a docetic view of Scripture is problematic for several reasons. In the
first place, Scripture appears to claim for itself and manifest in its contents more
of a role for human contributions and limitations than Bloesch acknowledges.43
A more adequate (biblical!) model of inspiration would view Scripture as the
product of divinely guided human attempts to express the revelation of God
within the particular cultural settings of the authors and under the limitations of
human intellectual and linguistic abilities.
Such a model would be more sensitive to limitations of human language for
expressing the fullness of God's revelation than Bloesch appears to be (p. 11). It
would also take the cultural influences on and input of the biblical authors more
seriously than Bloesch.44 While refusing to reduce Scripture to mere human
opinions, it would focus on how God's revelation emerges within, takes forms
appropriate to, critiques and transforms particular human expressions and be-
liefs in concrete human situations.
The obvious implication of such a view would be that the application of any
truths of revelation to other human cultural settings (such as our own) would
involve a process of distinguishing between the essential Word of God and the
culturally specific aspects of the particular biblical expression of that Word.45 In
particular, it would address carefully the question whether the male-normative
language and cultural patterns present in the Bible are part of the Word of God
or, rather, descriptions of the sinful human situation to which this Word is
addressed. Bloesch simply bypasses this process completely in his appeals to the
"language of Canaan."
In short, the central problem with Bloesch's model of revelation is that it
does not take the historical-situatedness of Scripture seriously enough. This
42One gets the impression Bloesch limits this claim to only the male or masculine images of God.
However, if that is the case then we are again faced with the question of what criteria justify such a
distinction.
43Cf. Clark Pinnock, The Scripture Principle (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984), pp. 85-152. This
treatment is particularly relevant for evangelicals because Pinnock's increasing recognition of the
human side of Scripture has come within their circles and in conversation with their issues.
^Note especially Bloesch's apparent (?) claim that the biblical prophets' use of patriarchal images had
its source solely in God's revelation, not their cultural setting, and that the meanings they ascribed to
these terms were totally different from the culturally typical meanings (pp. 39-40).
45See again footnote 7 above.
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helps explain his tendency to disregard or undervalue historical-critical perspec-
tives on the meaning of biblical symbols, especially "masculine" symbols.46 It
also helps explain why he does not seem to be adequately sensitive to how his
"obvious" readings of texts might be heavily influenced by personal and cultural
preunderstandings.
Bloesch is constantly attacking feminists for reading their ideology into bibli-
cal texts (pp. 58-60, xvi). By contrast, he apparently believes his own readings
approximate a dispassionate, non-ideological reading of the text (pp. 82-83). We
would agree with Hans-Georg Gadamer that such pretensions to presupposi-
tionless interpretation simply blind the interpreter to their remaining presup-
positions.47 The way to deal with presuppositions in the interpretation of texts is
not to try to "escape" them but to become conscious of them (through dialogue
and the historical distanciation of the text) and then to critically test their ade-
quacy by playing them out. As Bloesch himself notes, Christian feminists are quite
conscious of the presuppositions they are bringing to their reading of the text.
He considers this to be a weakness (p. 85). We would suggest it is a strength,
provided that their goal is to assess the appropriateness and adequacy of those
preunderstandings.48
Bloesch's charge that Christian feminists are imposing an unacceptable ide-
ology on the Christian faith provides an appropriate setting for asking whether
Bloesch is any more aware of or fair to the positions of Christian feminists in his
second book. The evidence is mixed. On the one hand, he is more aware of the
names of a variety of religious feminists, including Christian feminists. He even
provides a typology that separates Christian feminists from post-Christian femi-
nists (pp. 4-5).49 However, we would suggest he still does not give adequate
attention to (or take seriously enough) explicitly Christian feminists, particularly
evangelical Christian feminists.
The evidence for this charge is three-fold. In the first place, Bloesch clearly
believes that feminism in general does not speak for or represent the viewpoint
of the majority of women.50 As a result, he repeatedly cites non-feminist evan-
gelical women as authoritative on the issues under consideration (pp. xvii, 3-4)
but almost never quotes or dialogues with evangelical feminists.
Secondly, Bloesch continues the practice noted in his first book of attribut-
ing positions to Christian feminists that he only documents in post-Christian or
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^To cite one example, Bloesch rejects the alternative translation of "Son of Man" as "The Human One"
with the claim that "Son of Man" is an honorific title indicating a supernatural being, not a symbol for
representative humanity. Many biblical scholars would disagree, but Bloesch does not even acknowl-
edge there is a debate.
47For a summary of Gadamer's contribution to the problem of the hermeneutic circle, see Randy L.
Maddox, "Hermeneutic Circle—Vicious or Victorious?" Philosophy Today 27 (1983): 66-76.
^For a discussion of the impact of recognizing the inevitability of presuppositions in interpretation on
the authority of Scripture, see Randy L. Maddox, "Biblical Authority and Interpretation," TSF Bulletin
8.1 (1984-5): 5-8.
49Note, however, that the key criterion for his typology is simply whether they continue to use
traditional language for God or not! See our analysis of this criterion below.
^Cf. Bloesch, "Reply," p. 43, pt. 3.
Christian Scholar's Review
320 non-Christian feminists. For example, he charges that feminists, including some
evangelicals, are drifting toward a goddess spirituality; then presents as his only
evidence a speech by Jean Bolen, who makes no claim at all to be a Christian (p.
3). Or again, he argues that the adoption of female metaphors for God inevitably
leads one to adopt an immanent (pantheistic) view of God, offering as evidence
a quote from Starhawk, who is explicitly a non-Christian feminist (p. 44).
The third evidence that Bloesch fails to engage in a careful dialogue with
Christian feminists in this study is his repeated use of negative and inflammato-
ry comparisons to characterize their position. Among his favorite comparative
models are the Gnostics, Baalism, the German Christian movement and (a cur-
rent evangelical favorite) the New Age Movement (p. 90). It is noteworthy that
even a sympathetic critic like Elizabeth Achtemeier considers some of these
characterizations far-fetched.51 While there are instances of agreement between
feminists and some of these movements, sometimes on issues that merit real
critique, these instances are typically tangential. As a result, Bloesch's com-
parisons raise much more heat than light.
Once again, the result of Bloesch's failure to dialogue adequately with Chris-
tian feminists is that he repeatedly makes accusations or characterizations that
are misleading, if not totally inaccurate. Among examples noted already in his
previous study are continued charges that Christian feminists adopt an-
drogynous models of humanity (p. 58), affirm a literal view of God as female (p.
xvii) and advocate the independence of women from men (p. xviii). Charac-
teristic, in particular, of this second study are several questionable comparisons
with other contemporary theological currents. To cite one example, Bloesch
repeatedly suggests similarities between Christian feminists and process views
of God. In reality, many Christian feminists are very uncomfortable with process
views of God, for some of the same reasons that Bloesch suggests.52
There are two areas where Bloesch appears to misunderstand or distort
Christian feminist positions that demand special attention. The first area is their
understanding of the authority of Scripture in deciding issues of Christian doc-
trine and life. Bloesch's charge is that feminists make their personal experience
"the final court of appeal" in all such issues (p. 57). This is far from true as a
generalization. Many Christian feminists explicitly affirm Scripture as their pri-
mary authority and frequently appeal to the standard of the revelation of Christ
to judge experience—including women's experience.53
Moreover, it is significant that Bloesch misreads Rosemary Ruether when he
51She rightly rejects the identification with Gnosticism (p. xi), which most characteristically recom-
mends the type of dualism that feminists are very concerned to overcome!
52Cf. Jean Porter, "The Feminization of God: Second Thoughts on the Ethical Implications of Process
Theology," St. Luke's Journal of Theology 29 (1986): 251-60. Actually Bloesch's "sloppy" reading of
current theological positions affects more than feminists. For example, Moltmann is much more open to
the charge of being a tri-theist than of viewing God as bi-sexual or in a pantheistic mode (Cf. pp. 6, 91-
2).
53For example, Scanzoni and Hardesty, All We're Meant to Be, p. 21; Elizabeth Moltmann-Wendel, A
Land Flowing with Milk and Honey (New York: Crossroad, 1986), p. 70; and Diane Tennis, 7s God the Only
Reliable Father? (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1985), pp. 73ff.
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attempts to illustrate his charge. As he notes, Ruether claims that human experi-
ence is the "starting point and ending point of the hermeneutic circle" (p. 57).
That is, she argues that the process of theological reflection starts and ends in the
sphere of human life.54 However, she does not claim that the ultimate criterion of
theological judgment is experience. Rather, experience needs to be judged by
something more deeply rooted and reliable—a religious tradition.55
The other area where Bloesch's reading of the Christian feminists seems
most suspect is in the claim that they are trying to reject the Christian under-
standing of God as triune while he is defending it. While some Christian femi-
nists indeed approach a type of immanental pantheism (for example, Ruether),
one of the most significant currents in recent Christian feminist thought is a
deepening appreciation of the doctrine of the trinity, particularly in its Eastern
Orthodox form.56 The focus of this appreciation is the way in which the Eastern
understanding of God as fundamentally relational grounds an understanding of
humanity as also fundamentally relational; thereby helping overcome the indi-
vidualistic and dualistic elements that have crept into Christian theology in the
West from our "Greek" cultural milieu.
Seen in this light, it could be easily argued that what Bloesch is really
defending against the Christian feminists are the abstract and hierarchal ele-
ments in the traditional Western view of the trinity—a view which many would
suggest really amounts to a monarchial deism.57 To be sure, Bloesch claims that
God is both transcendant and immanent (pp. 29, 34). However, his stress is
clearly on transcendence and hierarchy (p. 53). He repeatedly expresses discom-
fort with any balancing stress on the immanence of God (pp. 100, 105, 53).
Likewise, Bloesch affirms the trinity in principle. However, he clearly conceives
of it as a trinity of "function" in God, not a trinity of God's very being (p. 31). In
all likelihood, he would accuse the alternative feminist (and Eastern Orthodox)
formulations of being tri-theistic. Such a case is well worth arguing. However,
our point would remain: this is not a battle between those who affirm the trinity
and those who deny it. It is a battle between two equally traditional (!) models of
the trinity.
This leads us to our last comment about Bloesch's second book. In his most
translucent moments it becomes clear that what Bloesch is really defending is
tradition. He defends traditional readings of Scripture. He defends traditional
language about God.58 He defends traditional hierarchal views of God.
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the full quote in Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 12.
55Ibid., p. 18. While Ruether would see Scripture as just one part of this tradition (p. 21), her main point
could easily be expressed in a more evangelical manner.
^See Maddox, "Inclusive Theology," pp. 12-13; and Barbara Brown Zikmund, "The Trinity and
Women's Experience," Christian Century 104 (1987): 354-56.
57Note his choice of designations as a monarchial trinitarian in Is the Bible Sexist? p. 93. We would make
the same claim about Elizabeth Achtemeier in "Female Language for God: Should the Church Adopt
it?" pp. 47-114 in The Hermeneutical Quest, edited by D. Miller (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1986). While
she raises some important questions about the pantheistic elements of some Christian feminists, her
alternative emphases seem to verge dangerously close to deism.
58It is no accident that his typology of feminists is organized around the question whether they accept
traditional language for God! (pp. 5-6).
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we would agree with Jaroslav Pelikan that one must be very careful not to totally
identify tradition with the truth it teaches (idolatry). Tradition is reliable but
human and, thus, fallible. At times cultural elements can creep in that distort the
essential revelation of which tradition is the icon.59 Christian feminists are claim-
ing that this is the case with regard to the individualistic and hierarchal elements
in the traditional (especially Western) view of God. They believe they are calling
us back to the true revelation of Christ. Such a call deserves to be examined on
its exegetical and theoretical merits, not rejected simply because it would call
into question the adequacy of current tradition.
Conclusions
Our survey of the books by Bloesch and Oddie has given us a sense of some
of the crucial issues at stake in the evangelical dialogue with the Christian
feminist critique. It has also illustrated for us some of the pitfalls and passions of
that dialogue. Are there any lessons we can draw from this exposure which
might help guide the ongoing dialogue in a more fruitful and faithful manner?
We would suggest seven points, all dealing with the need to make distinctions.
1. Interests of fairness and truth call us to distinguish carefully between
those feminists who self-consciously claim to be Christian and those who do not.
One may want to question the adequacy of their "Christian" formulations, but
we should at least read them on their own terms.
2. It is important to distinguish between what Christian feminists (or any
theologian!) reject and what they affirm. All too often it is assumed that if feminists
reject a particular position they must be affirming its polar opposite. Such is
often not the case!60
3. We should not assume we have to accept everything a particular the-
ologian says just because we find some elements of truth in their work (or vice
versa). Rather, we should distinguish between what seems valid and what does
not.
4. It is crucial to distinguish between theological language (for God or oth-
erwise) that is intended as literal and that which is affirmed as analogical.
5. It is important to distinguish between physical gender characteristics
which are based on biological realities and sexual role-types which are based on
cultural norms. To use a male image for God is not necessarily to attribute
"masculine" characteristics to God. Such characteristics vary by cultures.
6. It is necessary, in order to do justice to the situation-relatedness of Scrip-
ture, to distinguish between the Word of God per se and the culturally specific
59Cf. Jaroslav Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 55.
60To cite one further example, Achtemeier ("Female Language," p. 98) assumes that since Christian
feminists reject the exclusive use of male terms for God they must desire an exclusive use of female
terms—which she believes would necessarily lead them to a pantheistic view of God (p. 108). Actually,
most Christian feminists advocate a balance of male and female terms, which (by the logic of her
argument) would support a classic theist view of God!
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aspects of the particular biblical expressions of that Word; in other words, to
distinguish between what Scripture teaches and what it merely describes.
7. Finally, we would suggest that one of the most crucial distinctions that
any theologian makes in using Scripture as a norm is how one remains faithful to
the model of Christ. Even most traditionalist exegetes admit that Christ chal-
lenged elements of his patriarchal culture and worked to provide a greater
degree of freedom and worth to women in his day. What does this model
warrant for us today? Should we be content to remain at the point where Christ
arrived, changing nothing else? Or, should we continue to move in the direction
Christ was moving, tackling areas of injustice and oppression that he had neither




Reply to Randy Maddox
By Donald G. Bloesch
Because the recent issue of Christian Scholar's Review on feminism did not include 281
an evangelical critique of feminist theology, I thought it might be helpful to the
reader for me to redress the imbalance by offering some observations on Randy
Maddox's evaluation of my books Is the Bible Sexist? and The Battle for the Trinity.
Maddox sees a discrepancy between my recent books on language about
God and my Essentials of Evangelical Theology. There has been no change. In the
sacramental view of Scriptural authority, which I continue to uphold, a distinc-
tion is made between form and content but the two are regarded as inseparable.
Therefore, the language of the Bible concerning God, while not exhausting the
mystery of divinity, is the ordained avenue by which we come to meet diversity.
My position here is fully in accord with that of Calvin, Luther, and Earth. It is
this same high view of biblical authority that leads me to support the ordination
of women, as I explain in Is the Bible Sexist?
While Maddox labels my position a "reformed patriarchalism" (I have ac-
knowledged that I could just as well be called a "biblical feminist"), I have
indicated a marked preference in my book 7s the Bible Sexist? for the term "cove-
nantalism" because the relationship of God to humankind as well as the rela-
tionship of man and woman in Christian marriage is based on a covenant of
grace. To be sure, man's representative headship within the family is endorsed,
since this is clearly Pauline and New Testament teaching (as even feminists
agree), but I have pointed out that male headship is realized in a quite different
way from headship in patriarchal societies. With Christ as his example the
husband realizes his headship in the role of a servant, sacrificing himself for the
good of his family in the manner of Christ's sacrifice for his church (see Eph.
5:22-23).
In his article, "The Necessity of Recognizing Distinctions: Lessons from the Evangelical
Critique of Christian Feminist Theology" (CSR XVIL3, pp. 307-323), Randy L. Maddox
engages in critical discussion of two books by Donald G. Bloesch. In this reply Donald
Bloesch reaffirms and clarifies his "covenantal" understanding of man-woman rela-
tionships, and in the process underscores his criticisms of a number of the feminist the-
ologians discussed by Maddox. Mr. Bloesch teaches theology at the University of Dubuque
Theological Seminary.
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282 It is true that subordination is implied in this model of male-female rela-
tions, but this is not a servile subordination, which is enervating and degrading,
but a revolutionary subordination which is rejuvenating and liberating (see John
Howard Voder's Politics of Jesus). In the biblical perspective, subordination is not
imposed on man and woman but is offered to them as an opportunity for
service. Subordination is an invitation to participate in the trials and joys of the
kingdom, not a curse that must be combatted by self-affirmation (as in feminist
ideology). Maddox does the reader a signal disservice by not acknowledging the
revolutionary character of biblical headship and subordination, which is clearly
set forth in my book.
Maddox argues that I have not sufficiently investigated the writings of
Christian feminists. On the contrary, I have read and continue to read such
prolific and stimulating writers as Sallie McFague, Rosemary Ruether, Elisabeth
Schiissler-Fiorenza, Letty Russell, Virginia Mollenkott, and Dorothee Solle. I see
in them as I do in the post-Christian feminists a slide toward pantheism and
panentheism. When Sallie McFague in her latest book Models of God describes
nature as "the body of God," this can only blur the infinite qualitative difference
between God and creation. Elizabeth Achtemeier even sees in such a theology a
new religious idolatry: "The primary error in most of the feminist theologies —
such as McFague's — being written today is that they once again want to blur
the difference between God and his creation. If they prevail, we shall, once
again, as Paul says, worship the creature and creation rather than the Creator
(Romans 1:25)" (Presbyterian Outlook, March 14, 1988, p. 2).
Maddox does not really understand Rosemary Ruether if he believes her
position can be reconciled with that of evangelical Christianity. Ruether argues
that the biblical Hebraic traditions which are transmitted to us through the Bible
need to be corrected by Baalistic, Canaanite religion if they are to serve in the
formation of a church that is truly inclusive. In her more recent book Woman-
guides: Readings Toward a Feminist Theology she calls for a new canon, which
would include in addition to the Bible the writings of Goddess religions,
Gnosticism, and contemporary feminism.
Maddox claims that my hermeneutical approach to the Scriptures fails to
take account of the fact that everyone brings to Scripture certain theological and
philosophical presuppositions. I do indeed recognize this problem but hold that
we should endeavor to disengage ourselves from these presuppositions as much
as possible. At one time I was inclined to read the Bible through the lens of
existentialist presuppositions, but I now see the danger in that approach. We
can never come to the Bible without any presuppositions whatsoever, but we
need to subordinate these to the living Word of God, and let this Word recast
and sometimes overturn these presuppositions. Feminists like Elisabeth
Schiissler-Fiorenza believe that the Bible should be read through the lens of a
cultural ideology. I see ideology as an obstacle to the right understanding of
Scripture, and while not claiming an ideologically free perspective, I think we as
theologians should strive for this as much as possible.
Reply to Randy Maddox
I am fully in favor of the movement for women's rights in society and for the
dignity and equality of man and woman before God. I have been a vigorous
critic of the patriarchal mentality for some time because of its tendency to deni-
grate the accomplishments of woman. Sexism is a sin whether promoted by a
patriarchal or a feminist mind-set. (Sexism also exists in feminism where men
are frequently downgraded or where women who choose a vocation of moth-
erhood are devalued.) What I do oppose is aligning biblical faith with a particu-
lar ideology, such as feminism, and thereby blurring the role of God as Creator
and Redeemer. It is not women's liberation but goddess spirituality that needs to
be combatted in the church, and a growing number of young evangelicals are
becoming alert to this danger.
Everyone interested in this discussion should read Roland Frye's Language
for God and Feminist Language, recently issued by the Center of Theological Inqui-
ry, 50 Stockton Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540. Sections of this essay are
scheduled to be published in the Scottish Journal of Theology and Interpretation
magazines. Frye presents a convincing case that "mother similes" in the Bible
cannot be ranked on the same level as "Father metaphors," for Father, Son, and
Spirit are the self-designated names for God. I also urge the readers of Christian
Scholar's Review to study Paul Minear's excellent critique of the new UCC Book of
Worship in the Spring 1988 issue of Prism in which he shows how the movement
toward inclusive God-language in the church today is dismantling the tradi-
tional doctrine of the Trinity. Paul Minear, a distinguished UCC clergyman, is
widely considered an authority on the language of the Bible (see his brilliant
study Images of the Church in the New Testament).
It is now becoming more fully recognized in both feminist and nonfeminist
circles that feminism in its contemporary form is indebted to Gnosticism and
that feminist theology can legitimately be seen at least in part as a rebirth of
a Gnostic mentality. Sharon Zanter Ross, Associate Pastor of Holy Trinity
Lutheran Church in Irving, Texas, who considers herself a biblical feminist, has
this astute comment: "Against those who present themselves as being 'for wom-
en' in the Church: perhaps the most telling feature is their tendency to promote
women as idealized selves. This should come as no surprise when one remem-
bers the movement's roots in Christian liberalism. Women, we are told, are the
recipients of special divine knowledge (extra ecclesia) merely because we are
women. Our interpretation of scripture is therefore above criticism and our
inner knowledge is more important than that held by the community. . . . The
characteristics of this brand of feminism bear striking resemblance to the ancient
heresy of gnosticism. This gnosticism cannot find support in the true Gospel, so
it must manufacture artificial quotas in its quest for power. (How tired I am of
being asked to perform priestly tasks for no other reason than 'We need a
woman to. . . !' How insulting to the Spirit who visits us at ordination with gifts
for ministry!) It ... must reject anything which sounds even remotely 'male/
since what is considered male can only be less than the idealized female" (Forum
Letter, June 26,1988, pp. 7-8). Again, it should be noted that Rosemary Ruether,
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284 who regards herself as a reformist feminist, wishes to include Gnostic writings
in a new canon. Also see Pheme Perkins, "Sophia and the Mother-Father: the
Gnostic Goddess," in The Book of the Goddess Past and Present (ed. Carl Olson,
Crossroad); and Philip J. Lee, Against the Protestant Gnostics (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987).
To advocate a "balance of male and female terms" for God (as Maddox
does) is to create the impression that God is bisexual rather than Trinitarian. This
again is the route of Gnosticism (see Samuel Laeuchli, The Language of Faith, pp.
15-93), and it can only end in a dilution of the Father symbol and the subversion
of the Trinitarian name for God—Father, Son, and Spirit.
Maddox most seriously misreads me when he attributes to me a functional
rather than an ontological understanding of the Trinity. It is precisely the femi-
nists who drift into modalism when they seek to substitute such symbolism as
"Creator, Redeemer, and Sustainer" for "Father, Son, and Spirit." To call God
"Father-Mother" makes God binitarian rather than Trinitarian.
Doubtless Maddox wishes to remain true to Scripture, but he needs to
realize that his appeal is to a vision of God and the world that is closer to
androgyny than to biblical hierarchy (as opposed to patriarchal hierarchy). It is
the "direction [in which] Christ was moving" rather than the New Testament
assessment of who Christ is that forms the basis of his judgments. It is not the
Christ of Scripture to whom church tradition bears witness but the Christ who is
imposed on Scripture by the winds of modern culture that shapes his feminist
theology.
I am hopeful about the future, for I see feminists such as Martha Stortz,
Mary Stewart Van Lceuwen, Ruth Tucker, and Sharon Zanter Ross becoming
more critical of ideas alien to the gospel that now form a part of feminist ideology
and theology. Those who defend the traditional values of patriarchalism are also
raising questions that could threaten their ideology. If God is neither male nor
female, then how is God best described in our day? Does the Bible really sanc-
tion the patriarchal ethos even though the revelation of God is set in such an
ethos? In my book 7s the Bible Sexist? I have tried to show that the biblical view
should not be confounded with either patriarchalism or feminism.
I hope that this discussion will contribute to bridge-building between con-
flicting ideological parties in the church and perhaps even lead to the emergence
of a new vision of man-woman relations that is fully consonant with the biblical
revelation.
Reply to Donald Bloesch
By Randy L. Maddox
I want to thank Donald Bloesch for his response to my review of his recent
books on feminist issues. This kind of serious debate about the issues involved is
precisely what is needed. At the same time, since it is a debate, I must respond
to some of his clarifications and counter-charges.
First, Bloesch suggests some uncomfortableness with "my" labeling of his
position as "reformed patriarchalism." I must remind him I was quoting his
description of his position. My title of choice was "liberated traditionalism." The
more serious issue here is his protest that his appeal to "covenantalism" is a
significant alternative to patriarchalism because of its endorsement of "revolu-
tionary subordinationism." Contrary to his charge, I did mention that point in
my review. However, he is right that I did not stress it. The reason is that I do
not believe he takes seriously enough what is precisely the most distinctive
element of the revolutionary subordinationism. Comparative treatments of
Jesus' model and Paul's household codes with those of the larger Jewish and
Hellenistic culture highlight that what is distinctive is the call for mutual submis-
sion (thus, Eph. 5:21, which is part of Paul's household code). However much
Bloesch takes the "edge" off of male-headship, he ultimately holds onto the
principle that when agreement between the partners is not possible, the male
must decide. I do not find such "subordinationism" truly revolutionary. While I
agree strongly with Bloesch's point that the call of God to self-subordinating
service to God and others is a crucial and distinctive element of the Christian
view, I believe it is a call addressed equally to males and females in all areas
of life.
Second, Bloesch protests my suggestion that his earlier writings had a more
discerning distinction between the content and form of Scripture than the works
under consideration. If so, I am guilty of an unduly positive reading of his earlier
work! My problem with Bloesch's appeal to the "Language of Canaan" in de-
fense of patriarchal language and culture is not that I think he is trying to
"exhaust the mystery of divinity." Rather, it is the apparent arbitrariness of the
appeal. In particular, the "chosen culture" (Bloesch's term) for the biblical reve-
lation was not only patriarchal, but also a slave society with a monarchial gov-
ernment. Now, Bloesch does not (and, I believe, would not want to) defend the
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286 latter two social structures as essential to the Christian revelation or normative
for all later Christians. However, he does want to defend (however "modified")
patriarchalism. My question is what criteria he uses for distinguishing which
elements of the "chosen culture" remain normative and which do not (i.e., why
can the Church "move on" in the direction Christ was moving for the issues of
slavery and democracy, but not patriarchy?). He never tells us. (Hopefully the
books he recommends do!) One cannot help but wonder whether he defends
only the latter because only the latter is characteristic of our present culture!
Perhaps he is as liable to imposing a Christ shaped by the winds of modern
culture upon the Bible as he believes me to be.
Obviously, this last comment leads directly to the issue of the role of preun-
derstandings in hermeneutical and theological reflection. Bloesch is clearly sen-
sitive to this issue (I never claimed otherwise), and shares my concern that
Christians not allow their preunderstandings to control and distort the Word of
God. Where we differ is in our recommendations for how to pursue this end.
Bloesch continues to hold up the ideal of the individual interpreter approximat-
ing an ideologically free perspective. I do not believe that this is possible
individually. Rather, I follow Gadamer in suggesting the best way to help neu-
tralize the distorting effects of preunderstandings is within a community of dis-
course where the various participants play out their reading of Scripture in light
of their preunderstandings. As this takes place, some readings will be exposed
as incapable of convincingly dealing with the whole of Scripture. Others will be
modified by dialogue with the persuasive insights of alternative readings. Only
through such dialogue can we hope to subordinate our readings to the living
Word of God. As such, my willingness to listen to the Christian feminist read-
ings of Scripture along with those of Bloesch and even radical antifeminists is to
give opportunity for the full range of insights and implications of the positions to
emerge. I do not argue (or believe) that the Christian feminist reading is the final
authoritative one, but I do appreciate their self-conscious recognition that they
are contributing a reading that operates from a set of preunderstandings. I
simply wish the other participants in the debate were as self-aware. Then maybe
the process of listening to each other honestly and critically could really begin.
If such honest and critical dialogue is to take place, surely one of the prereq-
uisites is to respect the distinctiveness of the various participants in the debate.
On this point I continue to find Bloesch's summaries and analysis of the Chris-
tian feminist position lacking. The issue is not whether he has read several
Christian feminist writers, but how he argues his case against them. It is my
contention that he all too often summarizes as a "uniform feminist position" a
controversial point about which there is great disagreement among Christian
feminists—all the time without mentioning the disagreement. More important-
ly, he usually chooses for summary the contingent in the debate that is the most
radical. Indeed, he often resorts to quoting explicitly non-Christian feminists to
display the "Christian feminist position." The group that is consistently ignored
in his quotes is the "biblical" or "evangelical" Christian feminists like Bilezikian,
Scanzoni and Hardesty, etc. Bloesch's case might actually be strengthened if he
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would admit that these folks, who he may disagree with elsewhere, share his
concern about some features of other Christian or post-Christian feminism. Of
course, then he would have to admit that Christian feminists are actually a
diverse lot!
Bloesch's response to my review provides a good illustration of his tenden-
cy to "over-read" statements. He suggests I believe that Rosemary Ruether's
position can be reconciled with that of evangelical Christianity. He then points
out her recent book Womanguides, which speaks quite favorably of Goddess
religion, as evidence that such reconciliation is impossible. Note, however, that I
made no reference to this or other of her very recent work (which I also find
problematic). More importantly, I never suggested in any way that Ruether's
position as a whole should be accepted by evangelicals or other Christian femi-
nists. I dealt with Ruether specifically twice (cf. CSR XVIII:3, p. 321). First, I
pointed out that while Ruether makes experience the starting point of the-
ological reflection she does not make it the ultimate criterion—as Bloesch
charged—rather, she appeals to a religious tradition. (Note that in the footnote I
suggest dissatisfaction with Ruether's identification of this criterion!) Second, I
noted that Ruether does tend toward a type of immanental pantheism, but then
point out that there are other Christian feminists who are uncomfortable with
this (myself included!) and have found more help in the traditional doctrine of
the Trinity. I fail to see how this discussion suggests I believe Ruether's overall
position is reconcilable with an evangelical position. I pointed out two places it is
not! What I was asking for in the original review was a more distinguishing
reading of alternative positions that would avoid this type of misleading
generalization.
Having made such a request, let me clarify a misunderstanding. My choice
of terms suggests to Bloesch that I believe he affirms a "functional rather than an
ontological understanding of the Trinity." That is not what I intended. My
overall point in that context was that the debate between Bloesch and many
Christian feminists is not really one between those who affirm the Trinity and
those who do not. Rather, it is the current form of a long-standing Christian
difference over how to conceive and explain the Trinity. Bloesch is representa-
tive the Western Christian approach which, since Augustine, has started with
the assumption of the unity of God and then struggled to find ways to do justice
to the distinctness of the Persons. The worst fear of this tradition is tri-theism,
and that is what I meant in the comment about focussing trinity language on the
"functions" of God rather than the being. My phrase was poorly chosen. How-
ever, my essential point was that many Christian feminists are as concerned to
defend the Trinity as Bloesch—albeit, they see the Eastern Christian approach to
Trinity as being more helpful. This tradition starts with the assumption of the
distinctness of the Persons and then struggles to find ways to do justice to the
unity of God (through perichoresis, for example). Christian feminists find such an
understanding of Trinity more biblical and more affirming of the communal
nature of all of life than the Western approach. As such, it is not a Battle for the
Trinity, but a battle over understandings of the Trinity!
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Christian feminists. First, he continues to argue that Christian feminism nearly
universally endorses a move to pantheism. 1 can only refer back to my original
footnotes to document that many Christian feminists have expressed clear cri-
tiques of such a move. At the same time, Bloesch's (and Achtemeier's) strong
reactions to the pantheistic tendencies of some Christian feminists (and most
post-Christian feminists) so emphasize the transcendence and otherness of God
that they are more suggestive of deism than of classical theism. I would suggest
that a truly discerning dialogue on this issue may be a way of giving new life to
an authentically theistic view of God as both distinct from yet intimately in-
volved in creation.
Second, Bloesch's charge that I construe God as "bisexual" or that Christian
feminists are classically Gnostic fails to understand our stress on the analogical
nature of God-language. I expressly said that God transcends the human distinc-
tions of gender. This is not to make God partly male and partly female or bisex-
ual. It is to say that the distinction of sexuality does not exist in the Godhead. It
does exist, however, in human creation. (Thus, I do not teach androgyny and
neither do most Christian feminists—contrary to his suggestion.) Christian fem-
inists want to defend both male and female language for God as biblical and as
providing important disclosures of truth about God. They do not, however,
argue that God is in any literal way male or female. Now, the Gnostics often did
attribute sexuality to God (or the Gods)—in a dualistic manner. On this issue I
see Bloesch actually more reminiscent of the Gnostics in that he is concerned to
defend at least a core of "maleness" in God; i.e., he is the one who appears to
attribute sexuality to God—as did the Gnostics—not me.
Finally, I note that Bloesch contributed his response because he believed an
evangelical critique of feminist theology had been missing in the original issue of
CSR. While not without its critical comments, I admit my piece was not primarily
a critique of the Christian feminists. That should not be taken as evidence I do
not believe such a critique is necessary or helpful. Quite the contrary! There is
much in general feminist ideology and in many Christian feminist appropria-
tions of this ideology that demands careful critical reflection in light of the
Gospel. Among such issues I would include with Bloesch the suggestions by
some of androgyny, pantheism, the idealizing of the female as above the distor-
tions of original sin, and exclusivist feminist models of society and church.
However, the most serious present obstacle to such a critical interaction is that
the initial evangelical critiques have so caricatured and marginalized the Chris-
tian feminist positions that truly meaningful debate cannot yet take place. Hope-
fully, dialogues like this one will help to overcome this obstacle and bring about
the type of constructive and critical interchange that will enable us all to ap-
proach truly inclusive understandings of Christian belief and models of Christian
life. Thus I, like Dr. Bloesch, remain hopeful for the present!
